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E N V I R O N M E N T A L  S T U D I E S
Illuminating dark fishing fleets in North Korea
Jaeyoon Park1*†, Jungsam Lee2†, Katherine Seto3,4, Timothy Hochberg1, Brian A. Wong1,5,  
Nathan A. Miller1,6, Kenji Takasaki7, Hiroshi Kubota7, Yoshioki Oozeki7, Sejal Doshi8, 
Maya Midzik8, Quentin Hanich3, Brian Sullivan1, Paul Woods1, David A. Kroodsma1
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing threatens resource sustainability and equity. A major challenge with 
such activity is that most fishing vessels do not broadcast their positions and are “dark” in public monitoring 
systems. Combining four satellite technologies, we identify widespread illegal fishing by dark fleets in the waters 
between the Koreas, Japan, and Russia. We find >900 vessels of Chinese origin in 2017 and >700 in 2018 fished 
illegally in North Korean waters, catching an estimated amount of Todarodes pacificus approximating that of 
Japan and South Korea combined (>164,000 metric tons worth >$440 million). We further find ~3000 small-scale 
North Korean vessels fished, mostly illegally, in Russian waters. These results can inform independent oversight of 
transboundary fisheries and foreshadow a new era in satellite monitoring of fisheries.
INTRODUCTION
In October 2018, world leaders pledged more than $10 billion to 
protect the world’s oceans (1). A major objective of this initiative is 
to reduce illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which 
results in the loss of billions of dollars, threatens fish stocks and 
marine ecosystems, and jeopardizes the livelihoods and food secu-
rity of legitimate fishers and communities (2). IUU fishing, however, 
is often conducted by “dark fleets”—vessels that do not appear in 
public monitoring systems (3, 4)—and is therefore difficult to moni-
tor and enforce (5). Although many dark vessels operate legally and 
broadcast their positions on country-mandated vessel monitoring 
systems, these data are often tightly guarded, limiting usability for 
third-party oversight or transboundary management. Revealing the 
activities of dark vessels could address this information gap, improv-
ing transparency and accountability.
These challenges with dark fleets and IUU fishing are epitomized 
in the waters between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia, 
where geopolitical tensions and disputed boundaries create a vacuum 
of shared data and management (6). In these poorly observed waters, 
the same stocks of Todarodes pacificus (Japanese flying squid) are 
targeted by several fleets, including the Chinese distant-water fleet 
(7, 8). Although the Chinese fleet has fished in North Korean waters 
since 2004, its fishing activity and catches are only intermittently 
published, and not since 2016 (table S6). This lack of information 
sharing prevents accurate stock assessment in a fishery where re-
ported catches have dropped by 80 and 82% in South Korean and 
Japanese waters, respectively, since 2003 (9, 10). This inability to 
assess the stock is concerning considering the critical importance 
of squid in the region. T. pacificus is South Korea’s top seafood by 
production value (9), one of the top 5 seafoods consumed in Japan 
(11), and, until recent sanctions, was the third largest North Korean 
export (12).
In 2017, following North Korea’s testing of ballistic missiles, the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted resolutions to sanc-
tion the country, restricting foreign fishing after September 2017. 
These resolutions prohibit (i) the procurement of seafood from North 
Korea, (ii) joint ventures between North Korea and other countries 
without UN approval, and (iii) North Korea from selling or trans-
ferring fishing rights (13). Because sanctions under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter are binding and implemented via domestic law and 
policy, any violations of these sanctions by Chinese vessels since 
September 2017 would constitute a violation of public internation-
al law and domestic Chinese law (13–15). Despite this, the South 
Korean Coast Guard has observed hundreds of vessels crossing into 
North Korean waters, and random inspections of these vessels by 
the East Sea Fisheries Management Service suggest that they are 
of Chinese origin (13). Evidence of continued Chinese fishing in 
North Korean waters is also supported by domestic Chinese docu-
mentation (13). 
Here, to illuminate the activities of dark fleets in one of the most 
contested regions of the world’s ocean, we combine local expertise 
with four satellite technologies. Individual technologies have distinct 
limitations but, when combined, can provide an informative picture 
of fishing activity (table S1). Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) 
provide detailed movement and identity information but are used 
by only a fraction of vessels (16). Satellite synthetic aperture radar 
(SAR) can identify all large metal vessels and penetrate clouds but 
lacks regular, global coverage of the oceans (17). The Visible Infrared 
Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor has global, daily revisit time 
and can detect vessels with bright lights but is limited by clouds (18). 
Last, high-resolution optical imagery provides the best visual con-
firmation of vessel activity and type but is also limited by clouds and, 
until recently, was not available at high enough resolution and frequent 
enough revisit time to monitor fishing fleets spanning exclusive 
economic zones (EEZ) (19). Although these four technologies have 
previously been used to estimate fishing and identify individual vessels 
(16–19), they have not been combined to publicly reveal the activities 
and estimated catches of entire fleets at this scale.
RESULTS
To monitor the activity of these vessels, we obtained 22 days of 3-m 
resolution optical imagery from Earth-imaging company Planet’s 
1Global Fishing Watch, Washington, DC 20036, USA. 2Korea Maritime Institute, Busan, 
South Korea. 3Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University 
of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia. 4Environmental Studies Depart-
ment, University of California at Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA. 5Marine 
Geospatial Ecology Lab, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, 
Durham, NC 27708, USA. 6SkyTruth, Shepherdstown, WV 25443, USA. 7Japan Fisheries 
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satellite constellation, PlanetScope, covering most of the claimed 
North Korean EEZ in 2017 and 2018 (see fig. S1 for a map of our 
study area). We then trained a convolutional neural network to 
identify pair trawlers in this imagery, as these vessels show a distinc-
tive fishing pattern and comprise the largest proportion of foreign 
vessels in the region (Fig. 1, A, B, and D, and figs. S2 to S4 and S25). 
After identifying the location of the fleet with the neural network, 
we tasked Planet’s 0.72-m resolution SkySat satellites to image these 
vessels, further verifying that they are pair trawlers (Fig. 1C). We 
also used SAR imagery from three different satellites to verify the 
location and size of the fleet (Fig. 1E, figs. S7 to S11, and tables S2 
and S3). With these data, we estimate that at least 796 distinct pair 
trawlers operated in North Korean waters in 2017 and at least 588 
did so in 2018. Only a fraction of these vessels broadcast AIS (fig. S15); 
but the signals from these AIS-broadcasting vessels demonstrate that 
the vessels originated from Chinese ports and fished in Chinese waters 
(Fig. 2 and figs. S12 to S17). To further verify their Chinese origin, we 
matched AIS detections from 140 of these vessels to Planet imagery 
(Fig. 1, B and D, and fig. S5). The AIS signals of these vessels cor-
roborate the South Korean Coast Guard’s inspections, confirming 
that they originated from China.
The second most common fishing vessels thought to be of 
Chinese origin in North Korean waters are large, 55- to 60-m “lighting 
vessels” that use bright lights to lure target species (Fig. 3A, fig. S26, 
and movie S3); we identify these vessels by using low-resolution, 
high-sensitivity optical imagery (VIIRS) acquired at night. Although 
several fleets in the region use lights, Chinese vessels are known to 
be by far the brightest, carrying up to 700 incandescent bulbs and 
generating over 1000 lux, equivalent to the light of some football 
stadiums (13). This brightness allows us to distinguish these vessels 
from other fleets in the area (figs. S18 to S24), and we confirmed this 
vessel classification by tasking Planet’s higher-resolution SkySat to 
image an area where these bright vessels clustered (Fig. 3B). VIIRS 
enables us to estimate a minimum of 108 lighting vessels of Chinese 
origin operating in North Korean waters in 2017 and 130 in 2018. 
We also detected low-intensity lighting vessels, identified as the 
North Korean small-scale fleet. This fleet consists of small 10- to 
20-m wooden vessels with only 5 to 20 bulbs (Fig. 3C and fig. S27). 
We further verified vessel type through SAR (Fig. 3D) and Planet 
imagery of the port of Chongjin, North Korea (fig. S6). We estimate 
that about 3000 North Korean vessels fished in the Russian EEZ 
during 2018 (Fig. 4D).
Data from these satellites also allow us to quantify changes in 
vessel activity over time. For the North Korean small-scale vessels, 
we estimate that the number of fishing days has increased every year 
in the past 4 years from 39,000 in 2015 to 222,000 in 2018 (Fig. 4D). 
For vessels originating from China, we estimate 91,400 fishing days 
during 2017 (82,600 by pair trawlers and 8800 by lighting vessels) 
and 67,300 fishing days during 2018 (60,700 by pair trawlers and 
6600 by lighting vessels) (Fig. 4, A to C). These figures account for 
70% in 2017 and 91% in 2018 of the number of fishing days one 
would estimate based on the number of Chinese vessels crossing 
into or out of North Korean waters each month, as counted by the 
South Korean Coast Guard (Fig. 4C and tables S4 and S5). If we 
conservatively assume that the catch per unit effort (CPUE) for pair 
trawlers and lighting vessels of Chinese origin is similar to that of 
A B
C D E F
1 km
100 m
Fig. 1. Activity of pair trawlers originating from China in North Korean waters. (A) Pair trawler of Chinese origin on its way to North Korean waters (photographed by 
the South Korean authorities). (B) A satellite image of the pair trawler fleet operating in North Korea (PlanetScope, 3-m resolution). Gray ovals show where the neural net 
classifier identified pair trawlers. In this area, we received AIS messages from several vessels (only two are shown). White lines connect their most recent AIS position to 
the estimated position during the time of the satellite image based on extrapolating the vessel’s speed and course. In white is the 9-digit Maritime Mobile Service Identity 
(MMSI) of each. (C) Higher-resolution image of pair trawlers in operation in North Korea (SkySat, 0.72 m). (D) AIS tracks for one of the two vessels matched to (B), showing 
the vessel originating from Shandong province, China. (E) Pair trawlers across our study area identified by the convolutional neural network (CNN) classifier and optical 
imagery. Each Planet image (24 km by 7 km) is a gray rectangle on the map, with 447 total images for this day. Light purple box shows the location of the main fleet. 
(F) Pair trawlers identified through another technology, SAR, by counting vessels within 535 m of one another.
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smaller vessels in nearby waters, the total estimated likely Chinese 
catch would correspond to approximately 101,300 metric tons of 
squid worth $275 million in 2017 and 62,800 metric tons of squid 
worth $171 million in 2018 (13). Such catch figures would approxi-
mate those of Japan and South Korea combined from all their sur-
rounding seas (13).
DISCUSSION
This large number of previously unmonitored vessels poses a sub-
stantial challenge for stock management. A political stalemate due 
mainly to sovereignty conflicts and maritime boundary disputes has 
prevented regional joint fisheries management (20), while existing 
state-based efforts are ineffective because of a lack of shared vessel 
monitoring data, management arrangements, and comprehensive 
stock assessments. For instance, to prevent overfishing, South Korea 
sets the total allowable catch for squid, limits the lighting power of 
squid jiggers, bans pair trawling, and permits fewer than 40 small 
trawlers (13, 21–23). The likely Chinese fleet, however, targeting the 
same stock, uses brighter lighting power, pair trawling, and a greater 
number of vessels (13). Given the declining CPUEs of South Korean 
and Japanese squid jiggers and the drastic decline in squid larval 
densities since 2003 (24, 25), the large number of vessels revealed 
through this study is particularly concerning.
In addition to sustainability concerns, there are also substantial 
implications for fisheries governance and regional geopolitics. These 
vessels originate from China and, based on inspections by the South 
Korean authorities, are assumed to be owned and operated by Chinese 
interests (13). However, because the vessels often do not carry appro-
priate papers, they may plausibly be so-called “three-no boats” oper-
ating outside of official Chinese authority, with no registration, no 
flag, and no license to operate (26). If these vessels do not have ap-
proval from both the Chinese and North Korean governments, they 
are fishing illegally; Chinese regulations require ministerial approval 
to fish in foreign waters (15), and the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea grants coastal states sovereign rights to manage living marine 
A
CB
D
Fig. 3. Chinese and North Korean lighting vessels. (A) A 55- to 60-m Chinese lighting vessel near North Korean waters. (B) A Planet SkySat (0.72-m resolution) image 
of a Chinese lighting vessel. (C) A 10- to 20-m wooden North Korean lighting vessel in the Russian EEZ. (D) Vessel detections on 24 October 2017 by SAR, which detects 
large, metallic vessels but not smaller wooden ones [by PALSAR-2 (Phased Array L-band Synthetic Aperture Radar-2); blue box shows detection footprint, and blue dots 
show vessels]; and by VIIRS, 2 hours later, revealing lighting vessels with the brightest lights (red, >1000 nW/cm2/sr, mostly Chinese), with medium lights (orange, 50 to 
1000 nW/cm2/sr, South Korean or Chinese), and the dimmest lights (yellow, <50 nW/cm2/sr, mostly North Korean). Vessels in (D) (i) are Chinese lighting vessels, (ii) Chi-
nese pair trawlers (detected only by SAR), (iii) North Korean squid vessels (detected only by VIIRS), and (iv) the South Korean squid fleet.
Fig. 2. Origin of vessels fishing in North Korean waters. During 2017 and 2018, 
vessels that fished in North Korean waters originated from Chinese ports and also 
fished in Chinese waters. Included are all AIS positions broadcast by all vessels 
identified as likely fishing within the claimed North Korean EEZ. Each position was 
identified as fishing or nonfishing by the model described in (16).
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resources in their waters (27). Alternatively, if they are operating 
with approval from either or both governments, those state(s) are in 
violation of UN Security Council sanctions. Notably, the Chinese 
government has repeatedly refuted this latter scenario, confirming 
its support for the current sanctions (13). Regardless of the scenario, 
each results in the violation of either or both international and do-
mestic law. Bearing this in mind, our analysis identified over 900 dis-
tinct illegal vessels in 2017 after sanctions began and over 700 in 2018, 
representing the largest known case of illegal fishing perpetrated by 
a single distant-water fleet (2, 28, 29).
The presence of this foreign fleet also has severe consequences for 
North Korean small-scale fishers. Evidence suggests that competition 
A
B
C
D
Fig. 4. Satellites track fishing by Chinese and North Korean vessels. (A) Counts of Chinese pair trawlers and (B) lighting vessels operating in our study area during 2017 
and 2018. Because of weather conditions or incomplete coverage of the study area [e.g., Sentinel-1 footprint covers <1/2 of the study area (fig. S9)], vessel counts are 
mostly underestimates, so we use the maximum value over a half-month period to estimate the number of active vessels, which is shown by the gray bars. (C) Estimated 
total number of Chinese vessels operating in each half month (gray bars) is largely consistent with the counts of vessels from the South Korean Coast Guard (black line). 
(D) Estimated number of North Korean lighting vessels operating in the Russian EEZ, 2015–2018; data for each half-month period are the maximum number of VIIRS de-
tections below 50 nW/cm2/sr.
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from these larger trawlers displaces these small-scale wooden boats, 
shifting substantial effort to neighboring Russian waters. This kind 
of shift in response to foreign fleets has been documented elsewhere 
(30) and is also consistent with local fisheries ecology in this re-
gion. During the last trimester of the year, Japanese flying squid mi-
grate south, through the Russian EEZ (7), providing an opportunity 
for the North Koreans to fish before the foreign fleets deplete the 
stock. A large portion of this North Korean fishing in Russian waters 
is, however, also illegal. The Russian government has authorized 
fewer than 100 North Korean boats since 2014, and in 2017, no permits 
were granted (13). In contrast, we estimate about 3000 vessels fished 
in these waters during 2018. North Korean artisanal boats are se-
verely underequipped for the long-distance travel required to reach 
Russian fishing grounds (movies S1 and S2). As a result, between 
2014 and 2018, 505 North Korean boats washed ashore on Japanese 
coasts. These incidents frequently involve starvation and deaths, and 
local media reports that many fishing villages on the eastern coast of 
North Korea have now been coined “widows’ villages” (13). The illegal 
fishing patterns documented here likely exert a heavy toll on fish and 
fishers alike.
We suggest that this analysis represents the beginning of a new era 
in satellite monitoring of fisheries. Multiple satellite sources have 
long been available to government agencies for targeted surveillance. 
However, it is only with recent increases in data availability, acces-
sibility, and computing power that these techniques can now be 
performed at large enough spatial and temporal scales—and by small, 
independent groups of researchers—to enable transparent fisheries 
monitoring. Although some aspects of this study are particular to 
the region (e.g., prevalence of pair trawlers), most techniques are 
easily transferable, such as matching AIS to vessel detections from 
freely available global satellite imagery or radar. And for the satellite 
data sources that are not yet freely available, such as commercial 
satellite radar or high- resolution optical imagery, the cost per image 
is decreasing rapidly (13). Combining these satellite technologies 
can reveal the activities of dark fleets, filling a major gap in the man-
agement of transboundary fisheries. Furthermore, these technologies, 
when accompanied by local expertise, can identify potential hot 
spots of illegal, unregulated, or unreported fishing. Global fisheries 
have long been dominated by a culture of confidentiality and con-
cealment, and achieving a comprehensive view of fishing activities 
at sea is an important step toward sustainable and cooperative fisheries 
management.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The analysis on fishing access agreements in the region is presented 
in section S1. All satellite data sources and methods to identify fishing 
vessels operating in and around North Korean waters are explained 
in detail in sections S2 to S5 (optical imagery in section S2, SAR in 
section S3, AIS in section S4, and VIIRS in section S5). We describe 
in section S6 the information obtained from South Korean authori-
ties and various observations on the waters to validate our estimate 
of vessel presence and fishing activity. The legal analysis of the 
detected fishing activity is provided in section S7. Section S8 
demonstrates the method for estimating the amount and the mone-
tary value of the total catch in 2017–2018.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/6/30/eabb1197/DC1
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